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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1688 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SALVADOR ORTIZ-URESTI, 
        Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-16-cr-00418-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Edward G. Smith 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 31, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Salvador Ortiz-Uresti pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry after 
deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  He now appeals his forty-
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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eight month prison sentence on the ground that the District Court erred in concluding that 
his Colorado drug conviction constituted an “aggravated felony,” and thereby incorrectly 
raised the statutory maximum sentence from two years’ to twenty years’ imprisonment.  
He also contends that the District Court erred in imposing a term of supervised release.  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I 
 Ortiz-Uresti, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty in 2000 to a drug 
offense in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-405, and was sentenced to four 
years’ imprisonment.  A year later, he was removed from the United States to Mexico.  In 
2015, Ortiz-Uresti was arrested in Reading, Pennsylvania, pleaded guilty to state firearm 
and drug trafficking charges, and was sentenced to twenty-two to forty-eight months’ 
imprisonment.  After his arrest, he was interviewed by U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement agents, and he admitted that he did not have permission to return to the 
United States and was in the country illegally.   
Ortiz-Uresti was then charged in federal court with one count of illegal reentry 
after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, to which he pleaded guilty.  At the plea 
hearing, the District Court asked the Government to identify the aggravated felony that 
triggered the enhanced maximum sentence under § 1326(b)(2).  The Government stated 
that “in January of 2000, [Ortiz-Uresti] pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
a Schedule 2 controlled substance in the state of Colorado, and was sentenced to four 
years[’] imprisonment in March of 2000.”  App. 22-23.  Addressing Ortiz-Uresti, the 
District Court asked: “do you admit that you were in fact previously found guilty of 
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possession with intent to deliver . . . [i]n Colorado?”  App. 23.  Ortiz-Uresti replied 
“Yes,” App. 23, and agreed with the Government that in 2000, he “was arrested, charged 
and convicted for a drug trafficking offense,” App. 32.  The District Court also asked 
Ortiz-Uresti whether he understood that because of his prior conviction for an aggravated 
felony, he faced a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, pursuant to § 
1326(b)(2), and Ortiz-Uresti answered that he did.        
 Ortiz-Uresti’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommended applying 
an eight-level enhancement because he had been deported for a “felony drug distribution 
conviction.”  PSR ¶ 17.  The PSR described the conduct underlying the charge as 
“possess[ing] with intent to distribute more than 25 grams but less than 450 grams of 
cocaine,” PSR ¶ 28, calculated his guideline range at forty-six to fifty-seven months, and 
specified that he faced a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years.   
 At the sentencing hearing, Ortiz-Uresti’s counsel confirmed that his client had no 
objections or corrections to the factual findings, guidelines calculation, criminal history 
category, or applicable statutory maximum in the PSR.  The District Court sentenced 
Ortiz-Uresti to forty-eight months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his state 
firearm and drug sentence, and a three-year period of supervised release, reasoning that 
his drug convictions, prior deportation, and subsequent reentry demonstrated that he 
lacked “good rehabilitative potential.”  App. 64-65.  Ortiz-Uresti appeals. 
II1 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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A 
On appeal, Ortiz-Uresti argues for the first time that the District Court erred in 
concluding that his prior Colorado drug conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony.”  
Because Ortiz-Uresti failed to preserve his objection in the District Court, our review is 
for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  To establish plain error, Ortiz-Uresti must demonstrate: (1) an error; (2) that 
is clear or obvious; and (3) that affects his substantial rights.  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Mills, 
821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2016).  If all three prongs are satisfied, then our Court has 
discretion to remedy the error “only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. at 457 (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 Ortiz-Uresti was convicted of illegally reentering the United States following 
deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2).  The statutory maximum prison 
sentence for this offense increases from two years to ten years if a defendant’s prior 
removal “was subsequent to a conviction for commission of . . . a felony,” id. 
§ 1326(b)(1), and to twenty years if the removal followed “a conviction for commission 
of an aggravated felony,” id. § 1326(b)(2).   
To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, courts 
typically “first attempt to employ the formal categorical approach[, which] involves 
review of the statute of conviction without consulting other factual evidence.”  Avila v. 
Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  The categorical 
approach asks “whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically 
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fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.”  
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “There are, however, situations in which a statute of conviction is divisible, 
i.e., it ‘sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative,’” Avila, 826 F.3d 
at 666 (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013)), rather than a 
“single, indivisible set of elements,” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282.  “Where the statute of 
conviction is divisible,” Avila, 826 F.3d at 666, courts “may look beyond the face of the 
statute to the ‘charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 
and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented’ to 
determine which of the alternative elements was involved in the defendant’s conviction,” 
United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)).  The modified categorical approach, with its 
consideration of these documents, “renders opaque which element played a part of the 
defendant’s conviction.”  Descamps 133 S. Ct. at 2283; Abbott, 748 F.3d at 158.  Thus, 
we must next determine whether the Colorado drug statute is divisible.   
 At the time of Ortiz-Uresti’s conviction, the Colorado statute provided that it was 
unlawful for a person to knowingly 
manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, possess, or to possess with intent to 
manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute a controlled substance; or induce, 
attempt to induce, or conspire with one or more other persons, to 
manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, possess, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute a controlled substance.  
 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-18-405(1)(a) (1992).  The punishment for violating this 
provision varied based upon the type and amount of the substance involved.  For 
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example, an individual whose violation involved cocaine, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, id. § 18-18-204(2)(a)(IV), committed a class 3 felony, which carried a 
sentence of four to twelve years’ imprisonment, unless the conduct involved at least 
twenty-five grams but less than four hundred fifty grams of cocaine, in which case the 
offender faced a mandatory minimum term of four years.  Id. § 18-18-405(2)(a)(I), (3)(a).  
Thus, a specific amount of cocaine triggered, among other things, whether a mandatory 
minimum sentence applied.  “[A]ny facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties 
to which a criminal defendant is exposed are elements of a crime.”  Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Because the statute can be violated by the distribution of many types of drugs and the 
type and amount of drugs can increase the punishment, the statute includes several 
alternative elements and is therefore divisible.2  Abbott, 748 F.3d at 159; see also Mathis 
                                              
2 The Colorado Supreme Court has examined whether the Colorado statute is 
divisible and has reached conflicting results.  Compare People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 
466 (Colo. 2005) (holding that the statute defines a single offense for double jeopardy 
purposes because it is “structured as a series of acts, with reference to the same controlled 
substance and governed by a common mens rea,” and the “acts chosen for specific 
inclusion are not themselves mutually exclusive but overlap in various ways and cover a 
continuum of conduct from the production of a controlled substance to its delivery to 
another person, under any of a number of circumstances”) with People v. Valenzuela, 216 
P.3d 588, 592-93 (Colo. 2009) (holding that because “the structure of the offense 
provision makes clear that three distinct categories of actions are criminalized,” a 
sentencing enhancement for extraordinary risk of harm applied only to one portion of the 
crime).  These decisions, however, predate the United States Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Alleyne, Descamps, and Mathis, and therefore do not reflect how more current law 
would apply to this statute.   
Our sister circuit recently analyzed the 2014 version of the Colorado statute, 
which is materially similar to the 1999 version applicable to Ortiz-Uresti’s prior 
conviction, and concluded that the statute is indivisible.  United States v. McKibbon, 878 
F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 2017).  The court, however, relied only on the Colorado Supreme 
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v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016) (stating that “[i]f statutory alternatives 
carry different punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements”).  Because the 
statute is divisible, we may look at the charging instrument and other documents to 
determine which alternative elements had to be proven.   
Here, the charging instrument specified that the drug allegedly distributed was 
“cocaine” and the quantity was “at least twenty-five grams but less than four hundred 
fifty grams.”  Supp. App. at 6.  Thus, Ortiz-Uresti was convicted of distributing an 
amount of cocaine that carried a mandatory minimum term of four years’ imprisonment.   
 We must next determine whether such a crime constitutes an “aggravated felony” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  The definition of an “aggravated felony” includes “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime.”  Id. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B).  A drug trafficking crime, in turn, is defined as “any felony punishable 
under the Controlled Substances Act.”  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 188 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
Court’s decision in Abiodun and did not address the more recent decision in Valenzuela, 
which held that the statute criminalizes “three distinct categories of actions” and therefore 
casted doubt on Abiodun.  Moreover, the McKibbon court appears to have overlooked 
the teachings of Alleyne, Descamps, and Mathis, which dictate that any fact that impacts 
a statutory sentencing range is an element of the offense.  Here, because the penalty for 
violating the statute varies depending on the type and quantity of drug involved in the 
offense, the statute is divisible.  Although one means for violating the statute may not be 
a “drug trafficking crime,” we can apply the modified categorical approach, look at the 
charging instrument, and see that Ortiz-Uresti was convicted not of a mere offer to sell, 
but of possessing with intent to distribute an amount of cocaine that carried a mandatory 
minimum term of four years’ imprisonment.  See United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 
225-26 (3d Cir. 2013) (in determining whether a defendant’s prior conviction constitutes 
a violent felony using the modified categorical approach, a court may examine the entire 
charging document because “the blinders are already off, and there is no requirement to 
pretend otherwise”).  Thus, Ortiz-Uresti’s prior conviction qualifies as a “drug trafficking 
crime.”   
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§ 924(c)(2)).  A “state offense constitutes a felony punishable under the Controlled 
Substances Act only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal 
law.”  Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Courts ordinarily use either the “illicit trafficking” or “hypothetical federal felony” tests 
to determine whether a state drug statute qualifies as a felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  Avila, 826 F.3d at 667.   
We need not apply the illicit trafficking test to Ortiz-Uresti’s conviction because 
the “hypothetical felony route leads us clearly to the conclusion that [his] crime is an 
aggravated felony.”  Id.  A Colorado conviction for distribution of a controlled substance 
“is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) of the Controlled Substance Act,” which provides 
that it is a crime to “distribute . . . a controlled substance.”  Id.  “Where the controlled 
substance in question is cocaine, the crime [under § 841] is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of ‘not more than twenty years,’ which qualifies as a felony.”  Id. at 667-68 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)).  Because Ortiz-Uresti’s crime of conviction is 
analogous to the federal felony of distribution of cocaine prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 841 
and was punishable by a term exceeding one year,3 he committed an aggravated felony, 
and the District Court did not err in sentencing him in accordance with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b)(2). 
 
 
                                              
3 A crime punishable by a term exceeding one year is a felony under federal law.  
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559, 3581; Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 188.  
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B 
 Ortiz-Uresti also argues that the District Court erred in imposing a three-year term 
of supervised release because, as a deportable immigrant, he was presumptively exempt 
from such supervision.  Ortiz-Uresti failed to preserve this challenge, so we review for 
plain error.  United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 In Azcona-Polanco, our Court recently clarified a sentencing court’s procedural 
obligations in imposing a term of supervised release under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), which 
creates a presumption against supervised release in the case of a deportable immigrant.  
865 F.3d at 152-53; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) (“The court ordinarily should not impose a term 
of supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and 
the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.”).  We 
held that a sentencing court “must explain and justify the imposition of supervised release 
on a deportable immigrant,” and must “state the reasons in open court for imposing a 
term of supervised release on a deportable immigrant so that the appellate court is not left 
to speculate about the reasons.”  Id. at 153 (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The sentencing court’s explanation “should directly address the presumption 
against imposing supervised release and provide the court’s reasoning for taking a 
different course of action in the case before it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Even though the District Court did not have the benefit of our explanation in 
Azcona-Polanco, the District Court’s findings as to Ortiz-Uresti’s history of recidivism 
upon his reentry into the United States and the need to deter future criminal conduct 
provided its reasons for imposing a sentence that included supervised release and thus its 
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ruling was consistent with our teachings in that case.  The District Court stated that it was 
“particularly concern[ed]” by the “criminal activities of the defendant, both of which led 
to the deportation, then a re-entry, and then additional criminal offenses.”  App. 64.  The 
District Court also noted that Ortiz-Uresti “is currently serving a sentence as a result of 
the additional criminal activity that he engaged in after he had returned back to the 
United States in violation of the law[.]”  App. 64.  Therefore, although the District Court 
did not explicitly mention the presumption against supervised release for a deportable 
immigrant like Ortiz-Uresti, its findings reflect an understanding of that presumption, and 
its explanation provides us its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release.  Thus, 
the District Court did not err. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
